Abstract. SOBER-128 is a stream cipher designed by Rose and Hawkes in 2003. It can be also uses for generating Message Authentication Codes (MACs). The developers claimed that it is difficult to forge the MAC generated by SOBER-128, though, the security model defined in the proposal paper is not realistic. In this paper, we examine the security of the MAC generation function of SOBER-128 under the security notion given by Bellare and Namprempre. As a result, we show the MAC generation function of SOBER-128 is vulnerable against differential cryptanalysis. The success probability of this attack is estimated at 2 −6 .
Introduction
The desire to use a known cryptographic module for various applications exists from long ago. The first trial is realized as modes of operation of a block cipher. The OFB-mode and the counter-mode are the usages of a block cipher for a random number generation and CBC-MAC provides a message authentication mechanism. On the other hand, Anderson and Biham presented the construction of a block cipher from a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and a hash function [1] . The security of these modes of operation are provable under the assumption that the underlying primitives are ideal cryptographic functions.
Daemen considered the construction of elemental cryptographic functions, a block cipher, a PRNG , and a hash function, from unreliably weak functions, e.g., a round function of a block cipher [6] . The security of these constructions are not certain, but their processing speeds are often significantly faster than that of modes of operation. Daemen and Clapp proposed a cryptographic module Panama in 1998 [7] . Panama can be used as a PRNG and as a hash function. Ferguson et al. proposed an authenticated encryption algorithm Helix in 2003 [11] . Helix can be also used as a PRNG and for a MAC generation.
SOBER [18] is a stream cipher developed by Rose in 1998. SOBER adopts a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) defined over GF (2 8 ) as the update function of the internal state. This construction enables an efficient software implementation in 8-bit processors so that LFSRs defined over an extension field are employed not only by SOBER, but also by SSC2 [20] , SNOW [8, 10] , and so on.
Several variants of SOBER have been developed to strengthen its security or to be suitable for 16-bit and 32-bit processors. SOBER-t16 [12] , t32 [13] , Turing [14] , SOBER-128 [15] are the published algorithms. SOBER-t16 and t32 were submitted to NESSIE project, but were rejected because some security flaws are reported [4, 5, 9] . A weakness of the initialization of Turing has been also reported [16] .
SOBER-128 is the latest algorithm in SOBER family, and is the modified version of SOBER-t32. In addition, SOBER-128 can be used not only as a stream cipher, but also as a MAC generation. However, the security of MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 has not been evaluated, so is still unclear.
In this paper we examine the security of the MAC generation function of SOBER-128. We show that MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 is vulnerable against differential cryptanalysis and the forgery of the MAC generated by SOBER-128 is successful with high probability, about 2 −4 . The attack that we present in this paper is out of the expectation of the designers. Our attack follows the security notion defined by Bellare and Namprempre [2] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly we define the supposed attacker in this paper in Sect. 2. Secondly we briefly describe the MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 in Sect. 3. Then we show how to forge MAC generated by SOBER-128 in Sect. 4 and discuss the weakness of SOBER-128 in Sect. 5. At last we summarize the result in Sect. 6.
The model of the attack
The designers mentioned that it is necessary for the recovery of the internal state (or the secret key) to forge a MAC generated by SOBER-128 and resolved the difficulty of a MAC forgery into that of the recovery of the internal state. In the attack to recover the internal state, the attacker can generate a MAC for a message with a secret key and an IV only once. Under the security notional description, the attacker can make queries only to a (probabilistic) MAC generation oracle.
In this paper, we consider a MAC forgery attack without any knowledge about the secret internal state. The attacker we supposed is a malicious person in a public communication channel. In our attack, there are a sender of messages, a receiver, and the attacker. The sender sends pairs of messages and the associated tags (M, M AC(M, K)) to the receiver. The attacker intercepts them, changes only the messages, then sends (M , M AC(M, K)) to the receiver. The attack is successful if the receiver does not detect the manipulation of a message.
The security notion of this attack was given by Bellare and Namprempre [2] . Under the notion, the attacker can make queries not only to the MAC generation oracle, but also to the MAC verification oracle. For each query, the MAC verification oracle returns 1 if the attached tag is correct, and return 0 otherwise. In real communication, the MAC verification oracle is the receiver and he outputs a requirement of retransmission to the sender if he detects the manipulation. There is no difference between these two attacks if the oracles are deterministic as a MAC verification oracle can be constructed from a MAC generation oracle. However, they are essentially different if the oracle is probabilistic (i.e. the oracle has a nonce as an input). In our model, the attacker can make a query for each oracle. On the other hand, the attacker whom the designers supposed can make only a query to a MAC generation oracle. The difference is critical to apply our attack given in Sect. 4.
The algorithm of SOBER-128
SOBER-128 is a filtering generator which takes a secret key and an initial vector (IV) as inputs. The lengths of inputs are less than 128 bits. The update function of the internal state is an LFSR whose feedback polynomial is defined over GF (2 32 ). The non-linear filtering function consists of additions modulo 2 32 , XORing, circular shift, and 8 × 32-bit substitution box (S-box) S (See Figure 1 for detail).
The linear feedback shift register
Before giving the definition of the LFSR, we firstly define the bit representation of elements of a finite field GF(2 w ). The extension field over GF (2) is defined by the residue field GF (2)[z]/(ϕ(z)), where ϕ(z) is the irreducible polynomial. An element of GF(2 w ) is a polynomial whose degree is less than w. The bit representation of a polynomial a w−1 z
, where the notation || means a bit-concatenation. In the proposal of SOBER-128, the finite field GF (2 32 ) is defined by an extension field of a subfield GF (2 8 y) ), where g(y) = 0xd0·y 3 +0x2b·y 2 +0x43·y +0x67. The coefficients in the irreducible polynomial g are the hexadecimal expressions of the elements of GF (2 8 ). Now we can define the feedback polynomial p(x) of the LFSR of SOBER-128:
where α = 0x00000100 (hexadecimal expression) = y. 
Furthermore, we can reduce the calculation of the multiplication with a constant in GF(2 32 ) on 32-bit processor. The multiplication consists of only two operations, referring a pre-computed table Multab indexed by the most significant byte and a shift operation:
where^is the XORing operation and <<, >> are the left and right shift operations respectively.
Non-linear filtering N LF
The description of the non-linear filtering function N LF is not necessary for explaining our attack, but we give the brief description. N LF is defined by the following equation (See Figure 1. ):
where is the addition modulo 2 32 and ≫ is the rotation to right in a 32-bit register. 8 × 32-bit non-linear substitution f is defined by where a H and a L are the most significant 8 bits and the least significant 24 bits of the input a respectively (See Figure 2. ). S 1 and S 2 in Figure 2 are the substitution boxes that output 8 bits and 24 bits values respectively. Please refer the proposal document of SOBER-128 [15] for more detail about the substitution table. Konst is dependent on the initial values, and does not change after the initialization. Hence we can consider it is a key-dependent constant.
The message feedback function P F F
The message feedback function P F F is used for injecting a message to the LFSR in MAC generation. P F F is given by the following equation:
The value of the register R [4] is replaced by the output of P F F .
MAC generation
The MAC generation of SOBER-128 is divided into two phases. The first phase is called MAC accumulation and the second phase is called MAC finalization. Before starting MAC generation, the internal state is initialized with a secret key and an IV.
In the MAC accumulation phase, the message words are injected into the LFSR by using the message feedback function P F F :
In the MAC finalization phase, the internal state is mixed by XORing the constant IN IT KON ST to R [15] , applying the non-linear update function Diffuse 18 times. The non-linear function Diffuse is defined as follows:
Step 1. Updating the LFSR.
Step 2. Applying N LF to the register and replacing R [4] with the value R [4] ⊕ ν, where ν is the output of N LF .
After the mixing, SOBER-128 outputs MAC of arbitrary length. The last step is same as the random number generation using N LF .
The MAC forgery
Our attack aims to find a collision of messages with a same secret key and a same IV. For that, we apply differential cryptanalysis developed by Biham and Shamir [3] . Differential cryptanalysis observes the differential propagation of the target encryption function. In differential cryptanalysis, the attacker firstly encrypts amount of plaintext pairs with a fixed differential. and observes the distribution of the differentials of ciphertext. If the output differentials do not distribute uniformly, the attacker can recover some information of the secret key from the deviation of the distribution. The basic idea of our attack is finding a pair of message sequence P and P , which yields same internal state value at a certain time T with a secret key and an IV. In a practical sense, the purpose of the attack is finding the differential sequence {∆p t } t with which any message sequence pair P = {p t } t and P = {p t ⊕ ∆p t } t make a collision with high probability.
The search can be divided into two part. The search for the differential propagation of P F F with high probability and the construction of the differential elimination equation in the LFSR. In the following two subsection, each topic is discussed in detail.
The differential propagation in the message feedback function P F F
Firstly, we discuss about the differential propagation in the message feedback function P F F .
We denote the differential propagation in the function f by ∆ f → ∆ . The differential characteristic of non-linear permutation f is very large because the transformation is not uniform. Only the most significant byte is transformed non-linearly. so that any differential ∆ whose most significant byte is zero does not influenced by f , i.e., ∆ f → ∆ holds with probability 1. Hence, if the bytewise expression of the differential of the register R [4] is given by (0, δ 1 , δ 2 , 0) and the differential of the message injection p is given by (0, δ 1 , δ 2 , 0) , the following differential propagation of P F F holds with high probability:
How to eliminate differentials in the LFSR
Next we discuss how to eliminate differentials in the LFSR. To simplify the discussion, we replace the message feedback function P F F by XORing the message directly to R t [4] . In fact, Eq. 5 indicates that any differential of R t [4] can be entirely overwritten by addition to a message block. Hence the discussion with the simplified message injection is useful. To avoid confusion, we denote the message block at time t by q t and the differential by ∆q t respectively. The internal state initialized by a secret key K and an initial vector I is denoted by R 0 . We denote by R 0 (K, I) if the initial values should be clarified.
We denote the expression matrix of the LFSR of SOBER-128 defined over GF (2 32 ) by A. In the following discussion, we treat the internal state (registers) of the LFSR as a vector space over GF (2 32 ). Eq. 5 shows that the injection of the differential to the LFSR is identified by addition of the vector D t given by
The corresponding internal state to message sequence q t ⊕ ∆q t is given by
Eq. 6 indicates that the differential vector of the internal state becomes zero at time T iff the following equation is satisfied.
The differential vector D t = t (0, 0, 0, 0, ∆q t , 0, . . . , 0) is divided into the elemental vector e 4 = t (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and the coefficient ∆q i :
Multiplying a constant is commutative with any matrix, hence we can transform Eq. 7 as follows:
A differential sequence which satisfies this equation is given by CayleyHamilton relation. The characteristic polynomial of matrix A is given by Eq. 1 so that A satisfies the following relation:
where E is the identity matrix of dimension 17. Therefore the following differential sequence ∆q t satisfies Eq. 8:
On the other hand, we examined exhaustive search for bite-wise truncated differential of message sequences {∆q t } t which satisfy Eq. 9 and T ≤ 20 on PC. The experiment concludes that Eq. 10 gives the best differential set, i.e. both the time T and the number of non-zero differentials are smallest. Now we get back to the message injection by P F F . There are two different purpose to inject a message differential ∆p t into the LFSR. One is for injecting a certain differential value into a register, And the other is for eliminating a differential in R t [4] . For each case, ∆p t = ∆q t ≪ 8 and ∆p t = ∆q t yields the same result as in the discussion of the simplified message injection. Table 1 shows the propagation of the differential given in Eq. 10 in the internal state, where b = α · a.
Eq. 3 implies a significant characteristic of α. If the byte-wise expression of the differential ∆q 0 is given by (0, x, y, z), then α · ∆q 0 = (x, y, z, 0) holds for every x, y, z. For example, the 32-bit differentials corresponding to the truncated differentials a and b in Table 1 are given by 0x00000001 and 0x00000100 respectively.
The success probability of the MAC forgery
In the differential propagation of the message feedback function P F F given by Eq. 5, the differential changes probabilistically only at the addition over GF (2 32 ). Lipmaa and Moriai presented the efficient algorithm for calculating the differential probability of an addition modulo 2 n for arbitrary n [17] . For example, if the differential a = 0x00000001 in Eq. 10 is chosen, the differential probabilities of P F F at each time t = 0, 2, 13, 17 are 2 −2 , 2 −2 , 2 −1 , 2 −1 respectively. Therefore the success probability of the MAC forgery of SOBER-128 is about 2 −6 . We examined the attack with a sample code provided by the designers. The success probability of the experimental attack is about 2 −5.5 .
Discussion
Generally, the supposed attack in MAC forgery is adaptive chosen plaintext attack. However, the attack applied in the previous section is known plaintext attack. Any information about IVs and the secret key is not necessary as the attack is applicable even if the internal state is perfectly random. Besides, though SOBER-128 has authenticated encryption mechanism, encrypting messages does not strengthen the security of message authentication function because altering ciphertext is equal to altering plaintext for the encryption by a stream cipher. In this section, we examine some idea to improve the security of SOBER-128 and consider its efficiency.
The vulnerability of MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 is mainly derived from the fact that the substitution f is not uniformly non-linear. From the viewpoint of differential propagation, only the transformation of the most significant byte is non-linear. Besides, a rotation has no diffusion function. Hence at least 4 times iterations of these functions is necessary to apply the non-linear transformation to all bytes. This reduces the performance of SOBER-128.
Another idea to improve the security is injecting the output of P F F to plural registers for increasing the complexity. However, the transformation in Eq. 8 holds for any vector whose elements are defined by v i = x i · v (GF(2 32 )). Hence this change of algorithm does not improve the security.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the MAC generation algorithm of SOBER-128 is vulnerable under a certain practical assumption. We assume that the attacker intercepts the message and change some bits of the message, and sends it to the receiver. Under this assumption, the attacker can forge a message with probability 2 −6 .
